

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 OMB-01

ACDA-19 EB-11 NIC-01 DRC-01 /173 W

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R 230455Z MAR 74

FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0070

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

ULEMBASSY TAIPEI 6203

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USLO PEKING

USMISSION USNATO

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 HONG KONG 03259

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, IN

SUBJ: CHINA-INDIA

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SUMMARY: EVENTS OVER THE PAST YEAR HAVE OPENED THE WAY FOR

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS TO PICK UP ABOUT WHERE THEY LEFT OFF IN THE SPRING OF 1971. MOST IMPORTANT, PEKING NOW SEEMS SOMEWHAT REASSURED THAT INDIA DOES NOT WISH TO BECOME ENTANGLED IN SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. THE IMPROVEMENT OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND BANGLADESH, THE EROSION OF THE BANGLADESH TRAUMA AND THE SHARP DOWNTURN IN INDIA'S ECONOMY HAVE ALSO PROVIDED A FAVORABLE CONTEXT FOR DETENTE. INPUSHING DETENTE, THE PRC'S MAIN OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO ATTENUATE THE POLITICAL-STRATEGIC BASIS OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN SOUTH ASIA AND TO ENCOURAGE A BETTER BALANCE IN INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. THE CHINESE APPEAR INCRESINGLY TO SEE THEIR POSITION IN PAKISTAN MORE IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING THEIR CREDIBILITY AND THWARTING THE SOVIET'S "GREAT GAME" RATHER THAN BLOCKING INDIA'S HEGEMONY. THUS THE RELAXATION OF BOTH PAK AND CHINESE TENSIONS WITH INDIA WILL PROBABLY NOT MEAN THE END OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND PEKING. CHINA PRESENTLY SEEMS TO HAVE NO SERIOUS INTENTION OF TRYING TO WEAKEN INDIA ITSELF OR DRASTICALLY TO ALTER THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION. IT WILL HOWEVER CONTINUE TO EMPLOY ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC ASSETS TO CHECK OR IN SOME CASES WHITTLE DOWN INDIA'S REGIONAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE. THIS BASIC RIVALRY, AS WELL AS CONTINUING MUTUAL SUSPICIONS AND INDIA'S SENSITIVITY TO SOVIET ATTITUDES, WILL LIMIT RAPPROACHMENT. NEVERTHELESS THE APPARENT COMMON INTEREST IN SECURING THE GEO-POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN SOUTH ASIA PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OF SINO-INDIA RELATIONS. BUT WHILE PEKING WILL SEEK DETENTE, IT WILL CONTINUE TO VIEW INDIA AS A PATHOLOGICAL NEIGHBOR, THE SICK MAN OF ASIA WHOSE FATE IS BEST ISOLATED FROM THE CONTENTION OF THE POWERS. SINO-INDIAN DETENTE GENERALLY SHOULD FURTHER US INTERESTS, BUT IT IS NEITHER FEASIBLE NOR DESIRABLE FOR THE US TO ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE IT. END SUMMARY.

1. IN CONTRAST TO NEW DELHI'S SENSE OF INSECURITY AND INFERIORITY IN ITS DEALINGS WITH PEKING (NEW DELHI 12208, 1973) THE CHINESE FEEL FUNDAMENTALLY THREATENED BY INDIA ONLY TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH INDIA SEEMS TO BE ALLYING ITSELF TO POWERS HOSTILE TO THE PRC. AT THE TIME OF THE 1971 INDO-PAK WAR, PEKING FELT THAT ITS WORST FEARS MIGHT BE REALIZED. SUDDENLY INDIA LOOMED AS A POSSIBLE SURROGATE FOR SOVIET

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POWER. THE CHINESE SAW THE SOVIET-INDIA AND INDIA-BANGLADESH TREATIES AS THE FIRST EMERGING LINKS IN A SOVIET-SPONSORED "ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY" SYSTEM. CHINA WONDERED IF INDIA'S NEW SENSE OF STRENGTH MIGHT NOT EMBOLDEN IT TO GO AFTER ALL OF KASHMIR, SEEK A STRONGER POSITION IN THE HIMALAYAS AND EVEN STIR UP TROUBLE IN TIBET.

2. EVENTS OVER THE PAST YEAR, HOWEVER, HAVE APPEARED TO RE-ASSURE PEKING THAT INDIA DOES NOT WISH TO BECOME ENSNARLED IN SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. MOST IMPORTANT FROM CHINA'S POINT OF VIEW, WAS MRS. GANDHI'S RETICENCE ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY DURING BREZHNEV'S VISIT LAST NOVEMBER. IN ADDITION, INDIA'S AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN IN AUGUST ON THE RETURN OF PRISONERS, PAKISTAN'S RECENT RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH, AND INDIA'S CONSTRAINT ON THE BALUCHISTAN-PUSHTUNISTAN PROBLEM HAVE UNDERSCORED NEW DELHI'S CAUTIOUS PREFERENCE FOR THE STATUS QUO. PEKING HAS ALSO BEEN AWARE OF AND RESPONDED TO INDIAN EFFORTS OVER THE PAST YEAR TO MINIMIZE TIBET AS A SINO-INDIAN ISSUE (HONG KONG 4825, 1973). FINALLY, THE CHINESE HAVE PAID CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO INDIA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND THEY SEE THAT INDIA'S SELF-IMAGE AND EXPECTATIONS AS A POWER HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY MODIFIED SINCE THE HEYDAY OF

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1971-72 (NEW DELHI 3236). SINCE THE BREZHNEV VISIT, CHINESE MEDIA HAVE NOT PORTRAYED INDIA AS A MILITARY THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS (HONG KONG 2946).

3. THUS PEKING HOPES AND EXPECTS THAT SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS WILL PICK UP FROM WHERE THEY LEFT OFF IN THE SPRING OF 1971. AS IN THE EARLIER PERIOD, CHINA'S MAIN GOAL IN SEEKING BETTER TIES WITH INDIA IS TO ATTENUATE THE POLITICAL-STRATEGIC BASIS OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN SOUTH ASIA. THE SOVIET NAVAL BUILD-UP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN THE LAST FEW YEARS AND FEARS OF SOVIET POWER PLAYS IN AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN HAVE STRENGTHENED INTEREST IN THIS OBJECTIVE. PEKING PROBABLY DOES NOT EXPECT IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO SEE ANY SERIOUS WEAKENING OF EITHER SOVIET ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN INDIA OR THE IMPORTANCE OF THE USSR AS INDIA'S MAIN SOURCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IT DOES,

HOWEVER, HOPE TO ENCOURAGE A BETTER BALANCE IN INDIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND TO BOLSTER INDIA'S APPARENT INTENTION TO AVOID FURTHER ENTANGLEMENT WITH SOVIET INTERESTS. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS ALSO APPARENT THAT PEKING WELCOMES RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND NEW DELHI.

4. CHINA SEEMS PREPARED TO ACCEPT INDIA'S OBVIOUS PHYSICAL SUPERIORITY IN SOUTH ASIA IN THE SENSE THAT AT PRESENT IT HAS NO SERIOUS INTENTION OF TRYING TO WEAKEN INDIA ITSELF OR TO ALTER THE MILITARY BLANCE. BECAUSE OF CHINA'S ROADER INTERESTS, ITS PRESENT STYLE OF DIPLOMACY AND ITS SHORT, UNHAPPY EXPERIENCE WITH THE NAXALISES, PEKING IS LIKELY TO REMAIN RESTRAINED AND CAUTIOUS IN ANY MEDLING IN INDIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. (THERE ARE, OF COURSE, CONTINUED REPORTS OF LOW LEVEL SUPPORT BY CHINA FOR TRIBAL INSURGENTS FROM ASSAM.) BUT THE INDIANS ARE PROBABLY CORRECT IN BELIEVING THAT PEKING WILL TRY TO CHECK OR IN SOME CASES WHITTLE DOWN INDIA'S REGIONAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE. GIVEN THE INTEREST OF INDIA'S NEIGHBORS IN MAXIMIZING THEIR MANEUVERABILITY, CHINA VERY LIKELY EXPECTS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL WITH LIMITED ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC INPUT.

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USLO PEKING
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CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

5. CHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, ACCEPTS INDIA'S PRE-EMINENT POSITION IN NEPAL BUT WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE A HEGEMONIC INDIAN ROLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRC TOLERATES INDIAN DOMINANCE OF SIKKIM AS SUGGESTED BY ITS RELATIVELY MILD REACTION TO THE
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UPHEAVAL IN THAT STATE LAST YEAR, AND WHILE IT APPARENTLY HOPES TO PROVIDE SOME LEVERAGE TO BHUTAN, PEKING ALSO SEEMS PREPARED TO ACCEPT INDIA'S UPPER HAND THERE FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.

6. IN BANGLADESH, HOWEVER, CHINA IS STARTING FROM SCRATCH BUT VERY LIKELY EXPECTS A CONSIDERABLE NET GAIN IN INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF THE LAST 195 PAK POW'S ARE RETURNED, PEKING, WE BELIEVE, WILL ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH DACCA BEFORE THE NEXT UNGA SESSION. BUT THE PRC IS UNLIKELY TO SEEK A FUNDAMENTAL REORIENTATION OF BANGLADESH AWAY FROM INDIA TOWARD PRIMARY DEPENDENCE ON CHINA. IF ANTI-INDIAN RADICALISM TRIUMPHS IN BANGLADESH, CHINA WILL VERY LIKELY BE DRAWN INTO SUPPORTING IT BUT AT THIS POINT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN STIRRING UP DISORDERS. THE PRC IS ALSO SATISFIED WITH THE CURENT NEUTRALITY OF SRI LANKA AND ALTHOUGH PEKING PROVIDES SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT IT DOES NOT SEEK SPECIAL SECURITY LINKS.

7. CHINA'S TIES TO PAKISTAN NO LONGER SEEM ESSENTIALLY THE PRODUCT OF ITS OWN DISPUTE WITH INDIA. THE CHINESE APPEAR INCREASINGLY TO SEE THEIR CREDIBILITY AND THWARTING THE SOVIET'S "GREAT GAME" THAN BLOCKING INDIAN HEGEMONY. THUS THE RELAXATION OF PAK-INDIAN AND SINO-INDIAN TENSIONS WILL PROBABLY NOT MEAN THE END OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN PEKING AND ISLAMABAD (ISLAMABAD 1955). OVER THE PAST YEAR CHINA HAS CON-

TINUED TO ECHO FEARS EXPRESSED IN ISLAMABAD ABOUT THE ALLEGED SOVIET AMBITION TO CREATE A CORRIDOR OF CLIENT STATES TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. WHILE THIS LINE SERVES A PROPAGANDA PURPOSE, PEKING APPEARS TO TREAT IT AS A SERIOUS CONTINGENCY. THIS CONCERN HAS FURTHERED THE PRC'S INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH. CHINA ALSO WELCOMES PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP CLOSER POLITICAL-ECONOMIC TIES WITH IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF STATES (ISLAMABAD 1955). AT THE SAME TIME PEKING HAS NOT PLAYED UP INDIAN-IRANIAN DIFFICULTIES. THE GOAL OF REGIONAL STABILITY ALSO CAUSES PEKING TO FAVOR A SHELIVING OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE. ALTHOUGH DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF CHANG TSAI-CHIEN DURING HIS VISIT TO ISLAMABAD IN JANUARY REPEATED THE CALL FOR KASHMIR'S "SELF-DETERMINATION," MOST CHINESE STATEMENTS ON INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS HAVE AVOIDED

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OR DOWNPLAYED THIS ISSUE.

8. AS EMBASSY NEW DELHI HAS NOTED, PEKING'S STATUS ON THE WORLD STAGE IS NOT MUCH AFFECTED BY INDIA'S POSTURE TOWARD THE PRC (NEW DELHI 12208, 1973). CHINA CERTAINLY DOES NOT SEEM TO VIEW INDIA AS A THREATENING RIVAL IN THE THIRD WORLD. SINO-INDIAN FRICTION IS NO LONGER PROMINENT IN UN OR THIRD WORLD FORUMS. AN IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS WOULD, HOWEVER, TEND TO UNDERCUT SOVIET CHARGES OF ASIAN FEARS OF CHINA, TAKE FURTHER STEAM OUT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND FURTHER THE PRC'S IMAGE AS A LEADING LIGHT IN BOTH THE THIRD AND NON-ALIGNED WORLDS.

9. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER POTENTIAL GAINS FOR CHINA IN AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH INDIA. WHILE THE PRC WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH CONTINUED FREEZING OF THE SINO-INDIA BORDER PROBLEM, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE PLEASED TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT MORE OR LESS ON ITS TERMS. A SOLUTION TO THIS DISPUTE WOULD NOT ONLY PUT THE ISSUE TO REST AND PROMOTE STABILITY IN TIBET, BUT IT WOULD ALSO EMBARRASS MOSCOW'S POSITION ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER QUARREL. FINALLY AN IMPROVEMENT OF PEKING-NEW DELHI RELATIONS WOULD HAVE SOME MARGINAL EFFECT IN DISCOURAGING AN INDIAN DECISION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE THIS ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN RAISED BY PEKING, IT IS SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THE PRC FAVORS CONTINUED NUCLEAR ABSTINENCE BY NEW DELHI.

10. IN SHORT THERE APPEARS TO BE AMPLE REASONS FOR CHINA TO MOVE AHEAD WITH SINO-INDIAN DETENTE; AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF PAK-INDIAN-BANGLADESH RELATIONS AND THE MORE FAVORABLE VIEW OF INDIA'S SOVIET POLICY HAVE REMOVED THE MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS. MUTUAL SUSPICIONS, INDIA'S SENSITIVITY TO SOVIET ATTITUDES, AND CONTINUING SINO-INDIAN CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN SOUTH ASIA WILL LIMIT RAPPROCHEMENT. BUT PEKING LIKE NEW DELHI

SEEKS TO SECURE THE GEO-POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN THE REGION AS THE BEST WAY TO MINIMIZE POTENTIAL THREATS AND MAXIMIZE ITS OWN INFLUENCE. THIS COMMON OBJECTIVE SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A LIMITED BUT STILL SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS.

11. AT PRESENT WE DOUBT THAT CHINA'S DOMESTIC SCENE WILL AFFECT THIS ASSESSMENT. BUT ANOTHER BRAKE ON SINO-INDIAN RAPPROCHEMENT IS THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE CURRENT
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LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. (MAO IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION RECENTLY REAFFIRMED HIS ANTI-PATHY TOWARD THE INDIANS.) CHOU EN-LAI ALSO HAS PREDICTED CONTINUING TENSION IN SOUTH ASIA, AND HE AND OTHER CHINESE LEADERS APPEAR TO FORESEE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES AND TOWERING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS EVENTUALLY RESULTING IN INTERNAL UPHEAVAL IN INDIA AND THE BALKANIZATION OR RADICALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY. THUS WHILE PEKING WILL PURSUE SINO-INDIAN DETENTE, IT WILL CONTINUE TO VIEW INDIA AS A PATHOLOGICAL NEIGHBOR, THE SICK MAN OF ASIA WHOSE FATE IS BEST ISOLATED FROM THE CONTENTION OF THE POWERS.

12. BEYOND THE NEAR-TERM, POSSIBILITY OF RELAXATION, RETURN TO A WARMER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEKING AND NEW DELHI (WHICH MIGHT COME AFTER A BORDER AGREEMENT) WOULD BOOST THIRD WORLD UNITY AND CHINA'S CHAMPIONSHIP ROLE. THIS WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE MIXED CONSEQUENCES FOR THE US, E.G., IN SUCH AREAS AS MARITIME RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND TRADE POLICIES. BUT WE AGREE WITH NEW DELHI'S ASSESSMENT (NEW DELHI 12208, 1973) THAT SINO-INDIAN DETENTE WOULD GENERALLY FURTHER US INTERESTS BECAUSE IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY, REDUCE INDIA'S CONCERNS ABOUT BOTH SINO-PAKISTANI-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND SINO-US RELATIONS, AND WEAKEN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INDIA. LIKEWISE WE AGREE THAT IT IS NEITHER FEASIBLE NOR DESIRABLE FOR THE US DIRECTLY TO ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE SINO-INDIA RECONCILIATION.
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